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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
appropriate governing law is the law of the principal place of
defendant's business. Because the printing process of a national
periodical often extends over several states46 the selection of the
law of the main publishing office 41 will avoid complications in
locating the proper phase of the printing process.
Not only would the rule be simple in its application, but the
defendant would also be able to predict with fair accuracy
whether his actions will subject him to a suit for damages. 4
Before publishing an article, it is only natural that he look to his
own law regarding his liability for defamatory material rather
than to the law of some state or country where the article might
be accidentally circulated. As far as the plaintiff is concerned, he
can justifiably expect only that his recovery of damages will be
governed by an appropriate law. Nevertheless, to be certain that
no undue burdens are imposed on the plaintiff, an alternative
application of the law of the state of circulation is suggested, if
action is brought there and damages are limited for the harm
suffered in the state of the forum.49  Therefore, the plaintiff
seldom will have to travel to a foreign state in order to bring
suit.
Because the precise problem of a choice of law rule in multi-
state libels never has been presented in Louisiana, the courts are
in a position to turn to any theory. The decision of State v.
Moore5" perhaps can be said to be one step in the direction
towards the proposed rule of this article.
DONALD L. PELTIER
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES-THE REQUIREMENT OF
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that the right of parties
to a contract to have their reciprocal duties and obligations under
46. Cannon v. Time Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (composition
in one state, printing in another state, and distribution was handled from
still another state).
47. See 2 Rabel, loc. cit. supra note 37. Professor Rabel also advocates
the law of the main publishing house.
48. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W.Va.
L.Q. 156, 167-168 (emphasizes predictability). See also Rheinstein, loc. cit.
supra note 29.
49. Wright v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944);
Kelley v. Lowes Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
50. 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916) (in interpretation of venue statute, the
supreme court held that the criminal libel was committed at the place of
printing and publication and not in the parishes where circulated). However,
Vicknair v. Daily Publishing Co., 144 La. 809, 81 So. 324 (1919) distinguishes
the Moore case on the ground that it was a suit for criminal libel.
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that contract governed by the law of some particular jurisdiction
is limited to the selection as stipulated by them of the law of a
jurisdiction which has a real relation to the contract. Applying
this test to the situation appearing in the case at bar, we find
nothing in the record herein which in any way properly connects
the contract before us with the state of Florida. If it was the in-
tention of the parties, as revealed by the language employed by
them in the contract, to have the law of that state, as it was
where the contract was made, control the interpretation of such
contract, then that intention cannot be carried out and the law
of Florida has no application to the contract herein." Thus spoke
Judge Baker, in the case of Owen v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows
Company.'
In the much discussed case of Vita Foods, Incorporated v.
Unus Shipping Company2 a cargo of herring was shipped in a
Nova Scotian ship from Newfoundland to New York under a
bill of lading which was issued in Newfoundland and which ex-
pressly provided that "the proper law of the contract is to be
English law." The cargo was damaged as a result of the negligent
navigation of the ship, and the owners of the cargo brought suit
for the loss in the courts of Nova Scotia. They based their claim
on the argument that the bill of lading under which the cargo
was shipped was of a kind which was not allowed to be issued
under the law of Newfoundland, the place of contracting; that it
was, therefore, to be disregarded; that, consequently, the ship-
owners could not rely upon an express clause contained therein and
exempting them from liability for negligence and that their lia-
bility was consequently determined by the general rules on lia-
bility of common carriers. The defense was that the bill of lading
specifically provided that the "contract should be governed by
the English law" and that under English law the exemption clause
was valid. The consignee rebutted with the argument that the
transaction had no connection whatever with England and that
consequently, English law could not be made the proper law of
the contract by mere agreement of the parties. This argument
was explicitly rejected by Lord Wright, who, speaking for the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, said: "It will be con-
venient at this point to determine what is the proper law of the
contract. In their lordships' opinion the express words of the
bill of lading must receive effect, with the result that the contract
is governed by English law. It is now well settled that by English
1. 58 R.I. 162, 174, 192 AtI. 158, 164 (1937).
2. [1939] PAC. 277.
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law (and the law of Nova Scotia is the same) the proper law of
the contract 'is the law which the parties intended to apply.'
. . . But where the English rule that intention is the test applies,
and where there is an express statement by the parties of their
intention to select the law of the contract, it is difficult to see
what qualifications are possible; provided the intention expressed
is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoid-
ing the choice on the ground of public policy. . . . It might be
said that the transaction, which is one relating to the carriage
on a Nova Scotia ship of goods from Newfoundland to New York
between residents in those countries, contains nothing to connect
it in any way with English law, and therefore the choice could
not be seriously taken. Their Lordships reject this argument both
on grounds of principle and on the facts. Connection with English
law is not as a matter of principle essential. ' 3
An express clause in a contract stipulating that controversies
arising therefrom shall be decided under the law of a particular
state or country, will, as a general rule, be honored universally.4
But a survey of the American cases and authorities also shows
frequent expressions of an alleged exception to the effect that
the law so chosen by the contracting parties must have some real
and objective connection with the transaction. 5 Occasionally, the
connection is qualified to the extent that the contract either has
been concluded or is to be performed at the place whose law has
been chosen. 6 Among the cases in which this limitation of the
parties' freedom of choice has been formulated, usury cases oc-
cupy a conspicuous place.7 Here the requirement of substantial
3. [1939] A.C. 277, 289.
4. 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (1947) 369 (after
referring to summaries of Anglo-American law, continental law, Latin-Ameri-
can law, and Japanese law); Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of
Laws (1947) 269. See also Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws (1942) 389.
5. Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158(1937); Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.(2d) 724 (D.C. Pa. 1929); Bundy
v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931). See also Seeman
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); Merchants' and Manu-
facturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson, 69 F. (2d) 940 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); Craw-
ford v. Seattle, Renton and S.R. Co., 86 Wash. 628, 150 Pac. 155 (1915); 2
Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 1081, § 332.2. But see Duskin v. Pennsylvania
Central Airlines Corp., 71 F. Supp. 867 (Tenn. 1947); Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216
App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y. Supp. 184 (1926); Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.,
52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921).
6. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) § 332.2, at 1081.
7. Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. 65 (1839); Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co.,
43 F. (2d) 730 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 897, 51 S.Ct. 182, 75
L.Ed. 790 (1931); Merchants' and Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson,
69 F. (2d) 940 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 569, 79 L.Ed. 68, 55 S.Ct.
80 (1934); Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867); Locknane v. United States
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connection is often cited as decisive in determining whether or
not the courts will give effect to the stipulation by the parties for
the law of some particular state or country," while the real and
underlying consideration apparently is whether the stipulation
was made in "good faith,"9 that is, without intent to evade the
usury laws of some'state substantially connected with the trans-
action.10 In Brierly v. Commercial Credit Company," in a contract
made in Maryland for the loan of money to a Pennsylvania cor-
poration by a corporation with its principal place of business in
Maryland, a stipulation that Delaware law should "govern the
contract" was held ineffective by a federal court in Pennsylvania,
in determining whether the interest reserved was usurious, because
the State of Delaware had no objective relation with the trans-
action. The court then found a "presumed intention" that Mary-
land law should apply, saying, "the parties certainly had a legal
right to contract for a rate of interest which was lawful in Mary-
land, since the contract was made there,'1 2 excluding, however,
the obvious intent to evade this law by the stipulation of a differ-
ent law allowing a higher rate of interest. In a case where the
factual situation was identical, 13 the court again refused to give
effect to the stipulation for Delaware law because no transaction
had taken place in that state, but the argument that the contract
should be governed by Maryland law rather than that of North
Carolina was rejected on the grounds that the stipulation had not
been made in "good faith." A comparison of these two cases and
an examination of other cases indicate that the motivating con-
sideration of the decisions is the fear of the courts that to permit
the parties to choose a law having no connection with the trans-
action would in effect nullify the usury laws of the states with
which the transaction is connected. 4 Exemplifying this attitude
Savings and Loan Co., 103 Ky. 265, 44 S.W. 977 (1898); Goode v. Colorado
Investment Loan Co., 16 N.M. 461, 177 Pac. 856 (1911); Bundy v. Commercial
Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931).
8. See 2 Beale, loc. cit. supra note 6.
9. Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. 65 (1839). Following this case, the courts ac-
cepted the statement that parties' agreement upon a rule must be bona fide.
2 Beale, loc. cit. supra note 6. This rule has been most often applied in usury
cases.
10. Locknane v. United States Savings and Loan Co., 103 Ky. 265, 44
S.W. 977 (1898); Fidelity Savings Association v. Shea, 6 Idaho 405, 55 Pac.
1022 (1899) "Bona fide seems to mean that the place should not be inten-
tionally selected for the purpose of evasion." 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws:
A Comparative Study (1947) 410.
11. 43 F. (2d) 724, 730 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 897, 51 S.Ct.
182, 75 L.Ed. 790 (1931).
12. 43 F. (2d) 724, 728 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930).
13. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931).
14. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408, 47 S.Ct.
19501
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is the decision in London Finance Company v. Shattuck.5 An
application for a loan had been executed in New York by a resi-
dent of that state, but apparently had been acted upon in Massa-
chusetts, from which state the check was mailed. The lending
corporation had also required the borrower to execute a prom-
issory note bearing interest at the rate of three per centum per
month, and a confession of judgment. The New York court va-
cated a judgment by confession obtained against the defendant
on the promissory note, saying that "it was apparent the contract
was made in the state of New York" and the claim that it had
been made in the state of Massachusetts was "a mere subterfuge
for the purpose of evading the usury laws of the state of New
York." The courts are concerned with preventing the evasion of
usury statutes, which are enacted for the very purpose of pro-
tecting parties in an inferior bargaining position against economic
exploitation.
Even if the contract would be considered usurious under the
law of the place where it was made, or under the law of the place
where it was to be performed, many courts hold that the contract
will be upheld if it is valid under the law of either one of these.16
Although these latter cases would at first appear to negative the
idea that the courts are concerned with preventing evasion of the
usury statutes, they are perhaps better interpreted as evidencing
the reluctance of some courts to enforce regulatory laws thought
to be incompatible with the doctrine of laissez faire.
When the requirement of substantial connection is raised in
transportation cases, there is usually involved a provision in a
bill of lading limiting the carrier's liability, or exempting it from
liability completely, for loss due to theft or negligence, and pro-
viding that the contract shall be governed by the law of some
state or country under which such limitations are valid.
7
In these cases, also, the courts seem to rely, ostensibly at
least, upon the requirement of substantial connection to declare
626, 628, 71 L.Ed. 1123, 1127 (1927), where the court, in speaking of the quali-
fication of good faith, said, "The effect of the qualification is merely to
prevent the evasion or avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applic-
able, by the parties entering into the contract or stipulating for its perform-
ance at a place which has no normal relation to the transaction and to
whose law they would not otherwise be subject." See also 2 Rabel, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 411.
15. 221 N.Y. 702, 117 N.E. 1075 (1917).
16. See 2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1241, § 374.4; Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws (2 ed. 1938) § 108; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 212.
17. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A.C. 277; E.
Gerli and Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F. (2d) 115 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931); F. A.
Strauss and Co., Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
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these stipulations for a particular law invalid, yet in other cases
involving the validity of clauses limiting the liability of the car-
rier, one of the most commonly discussed questions has been
whether the shipper or passenger was in such an unfair bargain-
ing position that the contract was really the result of a form of
economic duress.'8 The English rule is that the expressed inten-
tion of the parties will be allowed to govern although the law
chosen has no connection with the contract,19 but even in the
Unus case, which is most often cited as authority for the rule,
Lord Wright said that the intention must be bona fide ("in good
faith").
"In good faith" has a variety of meanings, and certainly the
question of whether one of the parties had been coerced into an
agreement would be within the scope of almost any definition of
the term. It has been suggested that the possibility of a contract
having been executed under coercion should deter the forum
from attaching significance to expressions of the parties' inten-
tion as to the governing law.20 This would appear to be a just
requirement. But is there any reason for requiring, as the Ameri-
can courts generally do, an objective connection with the law
stipulated for,21 when the real concern appears to be a fear that
the agreement may not have been freely entered into? Does the
existence of a substantial connection with some particular state
or country negative, in some inexplicable manner, the possibility
of coercion? In a number of cases where foreign laws favorable
to the carriers were stipulated, they have been disregarded be-
cause frequently the party submitting thereto had no actual in-
tention to do so and there was no freedom of contract. 22 These
cases indicate that this fear of economic duress is the courts' real
concern, and not whether there is a "substantial connection" with
the stipulated law.
Many insurance contracts stipulate that the law of the place
18. See New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 379 (U.S.
1873): "The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality.
The latter is only one individual of a million. He cannot afford to higgle or
stand out and seek redress in the courts .... He prefers, rather, to accept
any bill of lading, or sign any paper the carrier presents; often, indeed,
without knowing what the one or the other contains. In most cases he has
no alternative but to do this, or abandon his business."
19. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A.C. 277; Jones
v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K.B. 130.
20. Note (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 663, 669.
21. See cases cited supra note 5 and cases collected in (1938) 112 A.L.R.
124, 125.
22. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724, 727 (1925);
Phillips v. The Energia, 56 Fed. 124 (S.D. N.Y. 1893).
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where the insurer has its seat of business shall govern the con-
tract.28 This law is important, for the insurer who must know
upon which law he has to compute his risk and, consequently,
the premiums. For this reason these stipulations are generally
upheld, unless the court finds that a local statute designed for
the protection of the citizens of the forum (which is usually the
domicile of the insured) would be evaded by giving effect to the
stipulation.2 4
The Missouri court thus found in the case of Cravens v. New
York Life Insurance Company2 that giving effect to a stipulation
for New York law would defeat the operation of a Missouri
statute providing for the issuance of extended insurance in the
event of default in the payment of premiums-a statute obviously
designed to prevent anyone from taking advantage of a person
in an economically weak bargaining position. A number of courts
have struck down agreements for the application of the laws of
other states, when to uphold them would permit evasion of a
statute of the insured's domicile which provided that only mis-
representations which were wilfully and fraudulently made, or
which were material to the risk, should void the policy.26 For
what other reason would legislatures enact such statutes if it
were not for a feeling that otherwise the insured would be forced
to contract under strict common law warranty, with the conse-
quent loss to his beneficiaries of benefits under the policy, regard-
less of whether or not the insured's misrepresentations had in
any way increased the insurer's risk? In the case of Griesemer v.
Mutual Life Insurance Company,27 the State of Washington ap-
parently had no statute requiring that extended policies should
be issued whenever the principal policy was forfeited for non-
payment of the premiums, and the court allowed the stipulation
for New York law. However, the effect of the decision was to
permit the insured to recover, for under New York law a policy
could not be forfeited for non-payment of premiums unless writ-
ten notice had been given the assured, which had not been done
in this case.
23. See cases collected (1938) 112 A.L.R. 130, 131.
24. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 Atl. 385 (1908), Dolan
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 173 Mass. 197, 53 N.E. 398 (1899);
Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S.W. 519 (1899); Keatley
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 197, 40 Atl. 808 (1898).
25. 148 Mo. 583, 50 S.W. 519 (1898), affirmed 178 U.S. 389, 20 S.Ct. 962. 44
L.Ed. 1116 (1900).
26. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 Atl. 385 (1908); Dolan
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 173 Mass. 197,. 53 N.E. 398 (1899).
27. 10 Wash. 202, 38 Pac. 1031 (1894).
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The leading case of Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows
Company28 involved the interpretation of an employment contract
made in Indiana. The employing circus maintained its winter'
quarters in Indiana and gave as its permanent address "Chicago,
Illinois"; but the contract provided that the contract should be
"localized" in Sarasota, Florida, and that all matters pertaining
to it should be decided according to the laws of Florida. The
plaintiff employee was given written notice of discharge in Mas-
sachusetts and was dismissed there. Suit was then brought in
Rhode Island, where the circus had moved for a routine perform-
ance. The court rejected the reference to Florida law, on the
ground that Florida had no "real relation to the contract," and
held that the law of Indiana, the place where the contract was
made, should govern. No further mention was made of Massachu-
setts, and simultaneously Indiana law was eliminated as not
proved. The result was that the Rhode Island court, whose juris-
diction of the case was purely accidental, applied its own law,
which certainly had no "real relation to the contract." Although
the result was an arbitrary and incorrect application of the re-
quirement of close connection, it tends to substantiate the theory
that the courts' real concern is the fear of "economic coercion,"
for under Florida law the plaintiff employee could have been dis-
missed practically at the defendant's pleasure.
Looking beyond the mere words used by the courts to explain
their decisions and seeking to ascertain the real motivations, it
seems that there is no need for the alleged general rule limiting
the choice of law by the parties to a state or country having some
objective connection with the transaction. 29 The courts have an-
other and more flexible tool with which to invalidate agreements
for the applicable law, that is, that the stipulation is the result
of a form of economic duress; and the cases demonstrate that it
is this latter rule which the courts are really applying.
There is, apparently, no American decision squarely holding
that there is freedom of choice to select a law which has no sub-
stantial connection with the contractual relation, but several
cases so indicate, at least in dicta.30 The most recent of these,
Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation,3 ' may sig-
nify a new point of departure for American decisions regarding
28. 58 R.I. 162, 174, 192 At. 158, 164, 112 A.L.R. 113 (1937).
29. Rabel, op. cit. supra note 4, at 408.
30. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.(2d) 727 (C.C.A.
6th, 1948); Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416
(1921); Hurwitz v. Iurwitz, 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y. Supp. 184 (1926).
31. 167 F.(2d) 727 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948).
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the freedom with which parties to a contract may stipulate as to
the applicable law. The defendant, a Delaware corporation, en-
tered into an employment contract with the plaintiff's husband
at its principal offices in Washington, D. C., which provided that
Pennsylvania law should govern the rights of the parties under
the contract. At the time of his death, the plaintiff's husband was
domiciled in Tennessee, and was temporarily a resident of New
York. The flight which resulted in his death in Alabama origi-
nated in New York. To the plaintiff's plea that the stipulation
for Pennsylvania law was invalid because "no part of the con-
tract was properly referable to that state," the court said, "There
seems no more justification for precluding parties to a contract
from stipulating that the laws of any jurisdiction, even if foreign
to the elements of the contract, should govern the rights and ob-
ligations of the parties, where not against public policy, than for
precluding them from stipulating in express terms what inter-
pretation should be placed upon certain terms, clauses or provi-
sions of the contract. ' 32 Although there was no formal determi-
nation of the presence of actual contacts with the contract, the
fact that there were substantial connections with Pennsylvania
detracts from the weight of this statement. 33 Though the case is
not authoritative, a stipulation that English law should be deter-
minative of the rights and obligations of the parties to a marine
insurance contract has been held valid, despite the absence of any
evidence that the transaction was in any manner related to Eng-
land;3 4 and the New York court has held that where two resi-
dents of that state entered into an antenuptial agreement in New
York that their property rights should be governed by the "Jewish
laws of Israel and Moses" the express agreement was sustained,
but on the ground that the so-called "laws of Moses and Israel"
were not really "foreign" laws.35
Arrayed against unlimited freedom of choice of the law ap-
plicable to a contract are such eminent writers as Beale, Falcon-
bridge, Goodrich, Judge Learned Hand, Westlake, and Loren-
zen.36 Their argument, purely a conceptualistic one, is substan-
32. Id. at 730.
33. The major portion of decedent's flying service had been over the
state of Pennsylvania, and each of his flights required a junction point stop
at Pittsburgh, where the defendant maintained a large operating base. De-
fendant also maintained and operated two other Pennsylvania bases.
34. Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921).
35. Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y. Supp. 184 (1926).
36. 2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1079, 1083, § 332.2; Falconbridge,
Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1947) 349; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2
ed. 1938) 278, 279. See Judge L. Hand's opinion in E. Gerli and Co. v. Cunard
COMMENTS
tially this: that the stipulation for the law applicable is itself al-
ready a contract. Therefore, in order to know whether or not the
contract is valid resort must be had to some legal system, and
that system can only be one with which the contract has some
contact, that is, that there is only one proper law which can de-
termine the validity of any contract. However, that this position
is untenable has been pointed out by such equally eminent writ-
ers as W. W. Cook, Nussbaum, Rheinstein, and Wolff.8 7
Assuming that the conceptual argument advanced against it
is not valid, are there any reasons why the freedom of the parties
to choose the law applicable to their contract ought to be de-
limited?
It has been suggested that there is a danger that the time of
the courts will be wasted by seeking to ascertain and interpret
some foreign, conceivably exotic law which the parties have
chosen without good reason.38 Without question, the time of the
court is too valuable to be so wasted; but experience has shown
that parties to a contract simply do not pick some law for no
reason. The example of two parties in Missouri stipulating for the
law of Pakistan lies within what has been termed the realm of
"unreal horribles." Experience has shown that in practically all
cases where the parties have agreed upon some particular law,
the law chosen has some connection with the contract, 39 albeit
a hidden one. At first glance, the contract in the Hagenbeck-
Wallace case seems to have no connection whatever with Florida;
but the significant factor, and the one which the Rhode Island
court apparently overlooked, is that Sarasota, Florida, is the
circus capital of the United States. It would seem desirable to
have all circuses operating under one law, and a uniform stipula-
tion for the law of Florida in all contracts concerning circus
people would give to their contracts a highly desirable certainty
and uniformity. Certainly it would be eminently just to permit
a Louisiana orange grower and a dealer to whom he was selling
his crop to agree that the law of California should be determina-
tive of their rights and obligations under the contract. The courts
S.S. Co., 48 F.(2d) 115 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931); Westlake, Private International Law
(7 ed. 1925) 302, 304; Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws
(1947) 215, 282.
37. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942)
393-401; Nussbaum, Principles of Private Inter-National Law (1943) 160-167;
Rheinstein, Book Review (1948) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 484-488, reviewing Fal-
conbridge, Essays on The Conflict of Laws (1947); Wolff, Private Inter-
national Law (1944) 420.
38. Cook, loc. cit. supra note 4, at 418.
39. Rabel, op. cit. supra note 4, at 405.
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and the legislature of California are without doubt more experi-
enced in dealing with the problems apt to arise out of transac-
tions involving the citrus industry, and the parties could thus
avoid many of the pitfalls possibly contained in the laws of a
state relatively inexperienced in coping with the problems pe-
culiar to this industry.
But there is at least one reason why the parties' freedom to
choose should not be completely unlimited. It is the danger that
the stipulation would become a device for overreaching purposes,
used by those in an economically stronger position to take ad-
vantage of those in an inferior bargaining position. With the eco-
nomic preponderance of big enterprises this could become a real
danger, if the right were permitted to exist unchecked. If the
parties are allowed to refer all circus contracts to Florida law for
decision, it is possible that the circus owners would, in time, be-
come so strong that they would be able to influence the passage
of laws in Florida which would be decidedly favorable to them,
and then to insist that all contracts contain an agreement that
Florida law shall govern the parties' rights under the contract.
These dangers, though real, do not require that the whole prin-
ciple of freedom of choice be cast aside. The law has means of
clamping down on abuses. The courts are not required to recog-
nize a stipulation if they feel that to do so would work undue
hardship or would be obviously unfair; and in every legal system
there are already in existence provisions for abrogating agree-
ments obtained under duress, coercion or compulsion. The desire
to obviate the danger of abuses does not, and should not, require
that the whole idea be discarded.
The problem has not yet arisen in Louisiana,4 0 but when it
does it is suggested that it be handled in the following way: that
the court uphold the stipulation as valid, without regard to the
existence of any substantial connection between the contract and
the law stipulated for, unless facts are shown or indicated which
strongly suggest the possibility of overreaching, or that the stipu-
lation was purely frivolous. If this procedure is followed when the
court is presented with the problem, the dangers which are al-
40. But see Hall v. Keller, 80 F. Supp. 763, 771 (1948), modified by 81 F.
Supp. 835 (W.D. La. 1948), wherein the court said, " '... the governing law of
a contract is that which the parties expressly or presumably intended,
provided such place has a reasonable relation to the transaction, and pro-
vided the parties in selecting the governing law acted in good faith.'"
(Italics supplied.)
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ways present when dogmatic principles are blindly adhered to
will be avoided.
J. DOUGLAS NESOM*
LAW DETERMINING THE STATUS OF A POSSESSOR OF
NEGOTIABLE PAPER
This paper will deal with the choice of law problems rela-
tive to the status of one who is in possession of negotiable paper
and who asserts claims against either the primary obligor(maker of a promissory note or acceptor of a bill of exchange)
or secondary obligors (drawer of a bill of exchange and en-
dorsers). Problems of the law applicable to the question of
negotiability and the nature of the defenses raised will be treated
incidentally.
Every transfer of a negotiable instrument has two aspects:
First, the endorser transfers title to the instrument and the
claims embodied therein; and, second, he guarantees payment
by the primary obligor.
The making of the instrument and each transfer constitute
separate transactions, each of which may be subject to the laws
of different jurisdictions. The applicable law ordinarily is that
of the place of payment. For makers and acceptors, the place
of payment is that made apparent in the instrument.1 Drawers'
and endorsers3 are usually deemed to have agreed to pay at their
respective places of business.
Though each obligor's liability is determined by the law of
his contract, it does not necessarily follow that the same law
* Graduate of February 1950, presently Member, Lake Charles Bar.
1. Mussou v. Lake, 45 U.S. 262, 11 L.Ed. 967 (1846); Phipps v. Harding,
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